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Indiana's Attorney-Discipline System Has a Moral Credibility Problem

3 minutes ago
8 min read

Naive new Indiana lawyers above taking their oath. Soon they will experience Indiana's Attorney-Discipline Kangaroo Court: Protection for the Powerful Firms, Rehabilitation for Some, Ruin for Others
Naive new Indiana lawyers above taking their oath. Soon they will experience Indiana's Attorney-Discipline Kangaroo Court: Protection for the Powerful Firms, Rehabilitation for Some, Ruin for Others

The Supreme Court finds room for rehabilitation when lawyers repeatedly break criminal laws, yet attorneys who challenge the fairness of old disciplinary proceedings can face professional exile. Who holds the guardians of legal ethics accountable?


INDIANAPOLIS — Indiana's Supreme Court has demonstrated an admirable capacity for mercy when attorneys violate criminal laws, even repeatedly. Yet that same institution can be remarkably unforgiving toward lawyers who challenge the fairness of disciplinary proceedings that ended their careers. The contrast raises an uncomfortable question about the state's regulation of the legal profession: Is Indiana's attorney-discipline system principally concerned with protecting the public and rehabilitating lawyers, or has it become an institution more interested in defending its own authority than examining its mistakes?


Consider the Indiana Supreme Court's October 29, 2026, disciplinary order involving attorney Glenn A. Grampp, Case No. 26S-DI-313. Grampp had accumulated three operating-while-intoxicated convictions and had previously faced professional discipline for alcohol-related misconduct. Nevertheless, the Court approved a 120-day suspension, with 90 days stayed, requiring only 30 days of active suspension beginning December 7. The disposition included probationary conditions and recognized his sobriety, monitoring, and participation in Indiana's Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program, commonly known as JLAP.


There is a defensible argument for that outcome. Addiction is treatable, rehabilitation is possible, and the purpose of professional discipline should not be to destroy careers unnecessarily. An attorney who demonstrates genuine recovery and the ability to practice responsibly should have a meaningful opportunity to return to the profession. But that principle should apply consistently, and it exposes a troubling disparity in a system where attorneys suspended without automatic reinstatement can spend years attempting to recover their licenses, even when they maintain that the original disciplinary proceedings were procedurally defective or based on unreliable evidence.


The issue is not that Indiana was too merciful toward Grampp. It is whether the Court has been sufficiently fair to other lawyers.


A System That Rewards Rehabilitation but Resists Reconsideration


Indiana's attorney-discipline machinery operates under the authority of the Supreme Court, which establishes the rules, appoints members of the Disciplinary Commission, and ultimately determines professional sanctions. The Court's rules expressly contemplate protecting the public from attorney misconduct while also protecting lawyers against unwarranted claims. In practice, however, the safeguards available to an attorney seeking to correct an allegedly unjust disciplinary judgment are not equivalent to the rehabilitative opportunities available to an attorney whose misconduct is attributed to a treatable condition.


The difference is particularly important in cases involving suspension without automatic reinstatement. Under Admission and Discipline Rule 23, an attorney in that position must petition for reinstatement, pay a filing fee, satisfy examination and other eligibility requirements, and establish fitness to resume practice. The process can require a hearing and additional litigation, with no guarantee that the attorney will return even after completing the minimum period of suspension. A sanction announced as a suspension of limited duration can therefore become a career-ending punishment in practical terms.


There are legitimate reasons to require proof of professional fitness before restoring an attorney's license. Lawyers who steal client funds, deceive courts, or repeatedly neglect clients can pose serious risks that a brief suspension will not remedy. But those concerns do not answer a different question: What happens when the lawyer seeking reinstatement contends that the underlying disciplinary findings were wrong, that critical evidence was unreliable, or that the original proceedings failed to provide meaningful due process? A reinstatement proceeding focused on rehabilitation is not necessarily an adequate mechanism for determining whether the original disciplinary judgment was just.


That distinction goes to the moral legitimacy of the entire system. An attorney convicted of drunk driving can acknowledge misconduct, pursue treatment, and demonstrate rehabilitation. An attorney who maintains that an ethics proceeding was fundamentally unfair may face a more difficult choice: accept responsibility for conduct the attorney disputes, or continue challenging the underlying judgment while remaining outside the profession.


Indiana should not create incentives for lawyers to abandon legitimate claims of innocence merely to satisfy institutional expectations of remorse. It should not allow trickery and unethical prosecutors, like Aaron Johnson, to use threats of perjury and fake plea bargains to entrap some. It should audit is cases and fix his errors. It must be seen as fair, not unfair. Currently, is seen as unfair and HE will continue to hammer it until it takes remedial review of at least some old DI cases, and takes some kind of reform steps like using mediation prior to opening investigations as suggested by Doug's Law.


Loretta is pure embarrasment to the profession of lawyering and she still has not learned from her erring or failings. In the past, HE reports have stated she is either corrupt or dumb and some are say both as many are seeking her post in which she has overstated her welcome and abused or misused her supervisory authority. The buck stops with her and she has allowed good lawyers to be ruined. She has her karma now and forever.


Adrienne Meiring will get her share of media attention soon as well if she continues to be ineffective and a pawn to the queen and king and not a bishop for justice, good, and reform, so to speak. Rush the Queen and Justice Massa or some other former shadowy figure, former Chief Justice still somehow in charge, or a former governor. This fiefdom has some issues.


JLAP Deserves Scrutiny, Not Automatic Deference


Indiana's Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program serves a legitimate purpose. It offers assistance to legal professionals dealing with substance-use disorders, mental-health concerns, and other conditions that may interfere with professional responsibilities. Its governing guidelines make clear that JLAP is not itself a disciplinary authority. Participation in treatment and monitoring can nevertheless become important evidence when the Supreme Court considers whether a lawyer should be suspended, placed on probation, or permitted to resume practice.


The Grampp case illustrates how rehabilitation can influence a disciplinary outcome. What remains less clear to the public is whether Indiana devotes comparable institutional attention and resources to attorneys who may have suffered unjust disciplinary outcomes. The state has created a recognizable framework for helping impaired lawyers recover their professional standing. It should be equally committed to identifying and correcting disciplinary judgments compromised by material procedural errors, unreliable evidence, or undisclosed conflicts of interest.


JLAP should not be accused of improper profiteering without evidence. But neither should any program associated with the judicial system be exempt from ordinary financial and performance scrutiny. The Supreme Court should publish understandable annual information concerning JLAP's funding, administrative expenses, outside-provider arrangements, participant monitoring costs, and measurable outcomes, while protecting confidential treatment records. The same transparency should extend to the Disciplinary Commission, including the costs of investigations, prosecutions, contested proceedings, and reinstatement litigation.


This is particularly important because the financial consequences of professional discipline extend far beyond the Court's formal sanctions. Attorneys can lose years of income, clients, professional relationships, and opportunities for advancement. Reinstatement involves a $500 filing fee, but the much larger economic burden may include legal representation, examination preparation, continuing education, and the difficulty of rebuilding a practice.


Those costs are not proof of financial exploitation by the judiciary. They are, however, powerful reasons to insist that the system imposing them operate with exceptional accuracy, consistency, and procedural fairness.


The Supreme Court Should Audit Its Own Disciplinary Record


Chief Justice Loretta Rush has an opportunity to confront a problem that Indiana's legal establishment has too little incentive to examine independently. The Supreme Court should commission an external review of attorney-discipline proceedings spanning at least the past two decades, with particular attention to cases involving disputed evidence, substantial procedural objections, unusually severe sanctions, and prolonged failures to obtain reinstatement.


Such a review would not presume that suspended attorneys were innocent or that disciplinary prosecutors acted improperly. It would ask whether material findings were supported by reliable evidence, whether respondents received meaningful opportunities to challenge accusations, whether sanctions were proportionate to comparable misconduct, and whether conflicts of interest were adequately identified and addressed. It should also determine whether subsequently discovered evidence undermines any final disciplinary judgments and whether Indiana provides an effective remedy when that occurs.


The review should include independent legal scholars, experienced practitioners from outside Indiana's disciplinary establishment, and specialists in professional responsibility and procedural due process. Its findings should be published in a manner that respects legally protected confidentiality, with recommendations for corrective procedures and, where justified, reconsideration of individual cases.


An independent audit would also permit a serious examination of sanction consistency. Why does one attorney receive a short suspension with automatic reinstatement while another receives an indefinite professional disability? How frequently does the Commission oppose reinstatement, and on what grounds? How many attorneys remain suspended years after completing their minimum disciplinary terms? How often does the Court modify the Commission's recommended sanctions, and what standards guide those decisions? These are measurable questions. Indiana should not expect the public to accept broad assurances of fairness when the relevant comparative information is difficult to obtain.


When Discipline Begins to Resemble a Kangaroo Court


The term kangaroo court should not be used casually. It suggests a proceeding in which the appearance of adjudication conceals a fundamentally unfair process. No responsible assessment can conclude that Indiana's entire disciplinary system meets that description merely because different lawyers receive different sanctions. Criminal convictions, dishonesty toward clients, failures of competence, and misconduct involving the administration of justice present distinct risks that can reasonably justify different outcomes.


Yet the appearance of institutional unfairness becomes difficult to dismiss when an organization empowered to judge the ethics of others lacks a sufficiently accessible and independent process for examining its own alleged errors. The problem is not simply whether a particular lawyer was punished too severely. It is whether the system can acknowledge that its prosecutors, hearing officers, and judges are fallible, and whether it provides a credible mechanism for correcting the consequences of that fallibility.


The Supreme Court's authority to regulate attorneys is substantial, but authority is not the same as moral credibility. A judicial institution that demands candor, fairness, competence, and accountability from lawyers must demonstrate those qualities in its own proceedings. When attorneys allege that disciplinary cases were driven by personal hostility, selective enforcement, false testimony, or procedural irregularities, the allegations should be evaluated against the record rather than accepted or dismissed reflexively. Proven misconduct by disciplinary officials should have consequences, just as proven misconduct by practicing attorneys does.


Indiana could also reduce unnecessary disciplinary conflict by adopting an appropriately limited version of the reform proposal known as Doug's Law, which calls for independent preliminary mediation before ordinary attorney-discipline or malpractice disputes proceed. Mediation could resolve misunderstandings, encourage early corrective action, and reduce the financial burden of disputes that do not warrant full adversarial proceedings. Serious dishonesty, criminal conduct, threats to clients, and other matters requiring immediate protective action would need clear exceptions. Such a proposal deserves consideration as part of a broader effort to make professional regulation less punitive without weakening public protection.


Justice Must Apply to the Judges of Lawyers, Too

The Grampp case should not become an argument against rehabilitation. It should become an argument for applying the underlying principle more fairly. Indiana has recognized that an attorney with repeated criminal convictions may deserve another opportunity after demonstrating recovery. That recognition is humane and consistent with the rehabilitative purposes of professional discipline. But the same commitment to fairness should extend to attorneys who can present credible evidence that their original disciplinary proceedings were unjust.


There is a profound difference between asking the Court to forgive proven misconduct and asking it to correct a punishment that should never have been imposed. A legitimate disciplinary system must be capable of doing both. Otherwise, its promise of rehabilitation becomes selective, and its insistence on professional ethics risks appearing more concerned with institutional obedience than justice.


Chief Justice Rush and the Indiana Supreme Court need not concede that past disciplinary decisions were corrupt to recognize the value of an independent audit. Indeed, a review that confirms the fairness of the Court's decisions would strengthen public confidence. A review that identifies serious errors would provide an opportunity to correct them. Either outcome would be preferable to leaving credible questions unanswered.


Indiana's lawyers are expected to acknowledge mistakes, correct errors, and act with integrity even when doing so is personally uncomfortable. The state's highest court should accept no lesser obligation for itself. The legitimacy of attorney discipline ultimately depends not on how effectively the judiciary can punish lawyers, but on whether it can demonstrate that its judgments are accurate, proportionate, and subject to meaningful correction.


A court that can find mercy for a lawyer convicted three times of drunk driving should also find the courage to examine whether it has unjustly destroyed the careers of others.


Justice cannot be a one-way street, and a disciplinary system unwilling to investigate its own mistakes has no business claiming a monopoly on professional morality.

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