Two Lawyers, Two Standards? Rokita's Federal Lawsuit Reopens Questions About Indiana's Troubled Attorney Discipline System

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Hoosier Enquirer | Legal Affairs and Editorial Analysis

INDIANAPOLIS — Indiana Attorney General Todd Rokita has taken his battle with the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission to federal court. This has been widely reported in the past week.

The AG in a 34 page complaint raises serious constitutional questions, just like former Attorney Doug Bernacchi once did as well, about an attorney discipline system that other Indiana lawyers have challenged for years.

But Rokita's lawsuit raises another uncomfortable question: Will Indiana's highest-ranking lawyer receive judicial consideration that other attorneys have been denied?

Rokita's federal lawsuit, filed October 1, 2026, names current and former members of the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission. He alleges that the commission has subjected him to repeated, unwarranted investigations in retaliation for constitutionally protected speech and other conduct.

The case is Theodore E. Rokita v. Bernard A. Carter et al., No. 1:26-cv-02118, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.

Rokita is seeking relief from a disciplinary system that he contends has been weaponized against him. His lawsuit also reveals that Indiana taxpayers have paid approximately $491,508 in private legal fees for his defense, according to reporting by The Indiana Citizen.

The allegations are serious, and the constitutional questions deserve examination. HE is considered filing for reopening of the case as an intervening party seeking truth and justice on the merits.

But Rokita is hardly the first Indiana attorney to question the fairness of the state's disciplinary machinery.

Former Indiana attorney Doug Bernacchi, paid over $250,000.00 in legal fees, but not paid by the state, and has challenged the system for years until 2021, alleging procedural irregularities, unfair treatment, no hearing, state-sponsored perjury, the use of a perjury trap to deny him witness and trial, and other denials of meaningful opportunities to present evidence, even in rebuttal.

He had no hearing and was allowed no hearing, and no appeal by Loretta Rush and others. His order was full of lies and inuendo and mentioned Mario Sims more than it did him, oddly.

The contrast between their cases deserves public scrutiny.

The Dismissal of Rokita's Second Case: On October 9, 2025, the Indiana Supreme Court dismissed a second disciplinary complaint against Rokita as moot. That complaint followed his 2023 public reprimand and concerned subsequent public statements that the commission alleged contradicted his earlier acceptance of responsibility.

The dismissal came after a three-member hearing panel had been appointed to consider the matter. The Supreme Court granted a joint petition to dismiss.

He notes that Bernacchi's own pending effort to intervene in Rokita's disciplinary proceedings raised issues about unequal treatment and the commission's practices, leading to a "Mootness" ruling as a matter of convenience. That had to anger the almight and all powerful wizard-of-oz types in Indianapolis.

Bernacchi argued in the past that his challenge helped expose the weaknesses of a disciplinary system that had previously rejected his own demands for procedural fairness or a sua sponte reopening of his case which had no investigation and for which a judge ordered he did not need to pay costs of that non-existant investigation by one Aaron Johnson of the Surpreme Court staff, where he was ethically conflicted as both a proscutor and investigator.

However, the published dismissal order does not establish that Bernacchi's motion caused the dismissal, or allowed for a ruling on his pleadings or motion, instead the Supreme Court ignored on his arguments by dismissing their sedond case against Rokita.

Any claim of a direct causal connection requires additional documentary evidence. But why not entertain Bernacchi's motion in that case? No other outlet has reported the news here, HE has often.

That distinction does not eliminate the broader question. Why should the procedural safeguards available to one Indiana lawyer differ from those available to another?

The Bernacchi Case: A Different Federal Outcome

Bernacchi's disciplinary controversy began years before Rokita filed his latest federal lawsuit.

In October 2017, the Indiana Supreme Court imposed a suspension of at least one year without automatic reinstatement following findings of professional misconduct. Bernacchi disputed aspects of the proceedings, including the reliability of testimony and the fairness of the disciplinary process.

The Southern District of Indiana subsequently initiated reciprocal disciplinary proceedings, Case No. 1:17-mc-00077, before Chief Judge Jane E. Magnus-Stinson, a Democrat Appointed Federal Judge.

Bernacchi challenged the state proceedings and requested an evidentiary hearing. The federal district court rejected his arguments and imposed reciprocal discipline.

The case reached the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which issued its decision on July 30, 2018, in In re Bernacchi, No. 18-1265.

The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision. It concluded that Bernacchi had not demonstrated serious defects in the underlying Indiana disciplinary proceedings sufficient to prevent reciprocal federal discipline.

The distinction is important. Bernacchi alleges that he was denied a meaningful opportunity to establish the factual basis of his objections. The Seventh Circuit, however, determined that the existing record was sufficient and that an additional evidentiary hearing was unnecessary.

Whether that approach provides adequate protection against procedural injustice is precisely the kind of question that should concern attorneys, judges and lawmakers.

Rokita's Complaint and the Danger of Weaponized Grievances

Rokita's latest federal complaint alleges a sustained pattern of disciplinary investigations arising from his public statements and official activities.

His dispute raises questions about the appropriate boundaries of attorney regulation when the attorney being investigated is also an elected constitutional officer.

One controversy involves a grievance arising from a personal jet ski dispute. Rokita has also challenged disciplinary proceedings involving his official conduct and public comments.

Bernacchi argues that Indiana's grievance process can be exploited by individuals involved in underlying civil disputes to gain leverage against opposing attorneys.

That concern warrants serious examination. Disciplinary proceedings should protect the public and uphold professional standards, not become tactical weapons in unrelated litigation.

At the same time, the filing of a disciplinary grievance does not, by itself, establish improper motives. Nor does an attorney's public office provide immunity from legitimate professional oversight.

An independent disciplinary system must be capable of distinguishing genuine misconduct from retaliatory or strategically motivated complaints.

The Constitutional Question Indiana Cannot Ignore

Bernacchi's experience demonstrates the substantial deference federal courts may give state disciplinary decisions.

Rokita is now asking a federal court to examine allegations that Indiana's disciplinary authorities have violated his constitutional rights.

The two proceedings are not legally identical. Bernacchi's verified federal appeal concerned reciprocal discipline, while Rokita has filed an independent federal civil action. Those differences may affect jurisdiction, immunity, available remedies and the standards governing each case.

Nevertheless, the principle underlying both controversies is the same: Every Indiana attorney deserves fair procedures and meaningful protection against unconstitutional government action.

If Rokita's lawsuit is dismissed because federal courts cannot provide the relief he seeks, the result will invite comparisons with Bernacchi's unsuccessful federal proceedings.

If Rokita's case proceeds, the court should explain the legal distinctions that justify its decision.

Different outcomes are not automatically evidence of unequal justice. But unexplained inconsistencies undermine public confidence, particularly when one litigant is Indiana's attorney general.

The Need for Independent Reform (Doug's Law would be a good start.)

Indiana's attorney disciplinary system operates under the authority of the Indiana Supreme Court. That arrangement makes judicial independence essential, but it also raises legitimate questions about institutional accountability when attorneys allege misconduct by the disciplinary authorities themselves.

Rokita's lawsuit presents an opportunity to examine whether existing safeguards adequately protect lawyers from retaliatory investigations while preserving the commission's ability to discipline genuine professional misconduct.

Bernacchi's longstanding complaints illustrate why any serious reform should extend beyond the circumstances of one politically prominent attorney.

The General Assembly, the judiciary and Indiana's legal profession should examine whether the current system provides sufficient transparency, independent review, meaningful evidentiary procedures and protections against conflicts of interest.

Rokita should not receive special treatment because he is attorney general. Neither should Bernacchi or any other attorney be denied meaningful legal protections because they lack political influence.

The Hoosier Enquirer believes the appropriate objective is not immunity from discipline. It is an accountable disciplinary system that applies the same constitutional principles to everyone.

If Indiana's attorney general can demand federal protection against an allegedly abusive disciplinary system, every Indiana lawyer deserves the same opportunity to establish a legally cognizable constitutional claim. Justice cannot depend on who holds public office.

Additional findings that should be included before publication

The person in the jet ski dispute is Jess Sampson of Rochester, Indiana. According to reporting on Rokita's federal complaint, Sampson filed a disciplinary grievance while the Attorney General's Office was pursuing a civil consumer-protection lawsuit arising from Rokita's personal watercraft transactions. The state sought $11,012.33 in consumer restitution. The available reporting identifies a civil action, not criminal charges against Sampson.

The published decisions also provide two particularly important quotations.

• Southern District of Indiana, 2018: In denying Bernacchi's challenge to reciprocal discipline, Judge Magnus-Stinson reasoned that, even excluding the testimony Bernacchi disputed, there was sufficient undisputed misconduct to justify the discipline. The Seventh Circuit quoted this reasoning and affirmed the district court on July 30, 2018.

  
  

• Indiana Supreme Court, October 9, 2025: The court dismissed Rokita's second disciplinary case after he and the commission agreed to a joint statement reaffirming his earlier acceptance of responsibility.

  
  

  NOTE: The published order establishes this negotiated resolution, not a connection to Bernacchi's intervention effort which was never addressed....

When Bernacchi appealed his 7th Circuit case to the United State Supreme Court the Clerk returned his Writ of Certiari with a 60 day extenstion to put it on different paper essentially and make it smaller in size. At great expense, he did that and then it was returned again this time saying was to have been filed 60 days earlier. "This crap is a game! A dirty game at that."

Bernacchi's account of his subsequent U.S. Supreme Court filing—particularly the alleged conflicting instructions from the Supreme Clerk's Office about a 60-day correction period is accurate, and likely if accepted Cert. would have been denied, as was the experience of Andrew Straw, a former IU Maurer Law School Associate Dean, and one of many other lawyers who was screwed by the Indiana Supreme Court where he once worked before being disbarred. The SCOUS not only denied hearing his dispute, Justice Roberts and Co. insulted him in doing so...the "Honorable" are just not honorable.