What Doesn't Loretta Rush Understand About Due Process? Indiana's Attorney Discipline Rules Need a Real Safety Valve

Why is Indiana Chief Justice Loretta Rush so dumb, stubborm, and/or corrupt? Oh yeah, she was appointed by a governor who said he viewed the 3 branches of government competing with one another; and his first loyalty was to the legislative process and his second to the executive branch, and that he'd never appoint a smart judge or seek to strengthen the third branch of government. "I don't appoint smart judges," Daniels retorted when asked about a very bad appointment to an open bench.

INDIANAPOLIS — Facts matter. Due process matters. Real justice for all matters.

Indiana Chief Justice Loretta Rush and her colleagues on the Indiana Supreme Court (SCOIN) regularly amend the rules governing lawyers, courts and judicial administration. They did so again in 2026. Yet one basic question deserves considerably more attention: What happens when an attorney disciplinary judgment has become final and credible evidence later emerges suggesting that the judgment itself was infected by fraud, newly discovered evidence, a constitutional defect or a fundamental miscarriage of justice?

Indiana needs a clearer answer like many other states have. They recognized the inherent weakness in the exclusive power of attorney regulation or they have a state bar association that acts more like a union than an arm of the powerful self-serving, never-wrong, crooks -- like Rush & Company.

In real life they look even more similar. Not serious people by design?

Justice Mark Massa, who was also appointed by Mitch Daniels, needs to go as well, or he needs to act, rather than sit like a bump on a log, looking like the Six Flags amusement park hawker that he so resembles.

Harsh words for a harsh reality. To be falsely labeled an unethical lawyer is much harsher,

HE supposes. Don't stop reading because of this truth. This is a serious public policy article with real meat, not red meat, but affordable meat that Hoosier Lawyers need to demand. HE has supported Doug's Law and now we support "PCRs" in DI cases or attorney disciplinary cases as a Constitutional Right all lawyer deserve.

Maybe more will go to law school or become practicing lawyers in Indiana, addressing the statewide lawyer shortage problem Rush & Company created, if they have this protection recognized and codified, too. This is serious business long overdue, just like Rush's retirement/resignation for the SCOIN.

Attorney discipline can destroy a professional career built over decades, and when that is done wrongly Rush, Massa, and the other lesser minds look away. And they are lesser than the dumbies appointed by Daniels, if you can imagine that. Indiana has a third branch of government worse than the drunk judges locally and the members of the Indiana General Assembly from places outside of Indianapolis or part of its ruling class.

Suspension or disbarment can eliminate an attorney's livelihood, close a law practice, damage a reputation and affect employees, clients and family members. Those consequences do not mean lawyers should receive special treatment. They mean a system exercising such enormous power should contain an extraordinary mechanism for correcting an extraordinary mistake.

Other Courts Understand the Concept

There is nothing radical about allowing a final judgment to be reopened under narrowly defined circumstances. American courts routinely balance two competing principles: judgments must eventually become final, but justice sometimes requires reconsideration when something fundamentally went wrong.

The same concept appears in several states' lawyer-disciplinary systems, although the procedures vary considerably.

Utah is particularly instructive. Its Supreme Court has recognized the applicability of Rules 59 and 60(b) in attorney-disciplinary proceedings where the disciplinary rules do not displace them. North Carolina likewise provides post-judgment mechanisms associated with Rules 59 and 60 in its disciplinary framework.

Other jurisdictions use rehearing, reconsideration, modification or extraordinary-relief procedures rather than calling the remedy “Rule 60.” The terminology is less important than the principle: finality does not necessarily require a court to preserve a judgment that can later be demonstrated to be fundamentally defective.

That does not establish a federal constitutional right to unlimited post-judgment litigation in every disciplinary case. No responsible reform proposal should pretend that it does.

It does demonstrate that meaningful post-judgment relief and effective attorney regulation can coexist.

Indiana Already Recognizes the Idea

Indiana's system is not completely devoid of relief from disciplinary orders. Rule 23 contains procedures governing attorney discipline, suspension, probation and reinstatement. The larger problem is whether Indiana provides a sufficiently explicit and durable mechanism comparable to the extraordinary relief available from judgments elsewhere in American law.

That distinction becomes important when evidence emerges long after ordinary reconsideration or appellate opportunities have expired.

Suppose evidence establishes that testimony material to a disciplinary judgment was knowingly false. Suppose decisive evidence was concealed. Suppose newly discovered records demonstrate that a central factual finding could not have been true. Suppose an attorney establishes that the proceeding suffered from a fundamental constitutional due-process violation.

What precisely is that lawyer supposed to file?

More importantly, what standard is the Indiana Supreme Court required to apply?

Those questions should have clear answers before the extraordinary case arrives—not after it.

Reinstatement Doesn't Solve the Problem

Indiana can point to reinstatement procedures, but reinstatement and exoneration address fundamentally different questions.

Reinstatement ordinarily asks whether a disciplined attorney should be permitted to practice again. It can involve rehabilitation, compliance with previous orders, professional fitness and other considerations.

But imagine an attorney disciplined for misconduct that newly discovered and indisputable evidence later establishes did not occur as adjudicated.

Telling that lawyer to demonstrate rehabilitation would be almost nonsensical.

The lawyer isn't saying, “I did it, but I have changed.” The lawyer is saying, “The judgment was wrong.” A disciplinary system needs a procedure capable of distinguishing those two propositions.

Rush & Company Have the Power to Change the Court Rules

This is where Chief Justice Rush appropriately becomes part of the story—not because Rule 23 is hers alone, which by itself is wrong, but because she leads the institution possessing extraordinary authority over Indiana's legal profession.

The Indiana Supreme Court's own public records demonstrate that amending court rules is hardly unusual. The Court issued multiple rule-amendment orders during 2026, including amendments to the Admission and Discipline Rules.

The Court also maintains an established public rulemaking process through which proposed amendments are published and public comments solicited. As recently as March 2026, proposed Admission and Discipline Rule amendments went through that process.

Rule 23 does not provide attorneys with the kind of detailed framework familiar under Trial Rule 60(B), identifying such grounds as mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, void judgments and other extraordinary circumstances. Nor does Rule 23 clearly establish a separate procedure for allegations of fraud upon the disciplinary tribunal.

Afraid to Advocate for Reform

Indiana should correct its own uncertainty. Now this sounds like something that should be in a law review article by one of our state's distinquished law professors, save our Indiana Law Schools are staffed by almost all sycophants afraid of the exclusive power the SCOIN has over their own law licenses, and legal careers.

Indiana's current system isn't entirely silent. Admission and Discipline Rule 23, Section 18(l), provides that a request for relief ordinarily must be made by written motion and states:

“A motion for relief from a prior order shall be filed no later than thirty (30) days after the date of the order, absent good cause shown for seeking relief at a later date.”

That language is significant because Indiana therefore already recognizes the concept of relief from a prior disciplinary order.

The Problem is What Happens Years Later When Extraordinary Evidence Emerges

Rule 23 does not provide attorneys with the kind of detailed framework familiar under Trial Rule 60(B), identifying such grounds as mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, void judgments and other extraordinary circumstances. Nor does Rule 23 clearly establish a separate procedure for allegations of fraud upon the disciplinary tribunal.

So this isn't primarily a question of whether the Court can address the problem. It can.

The question is why it hasn't created a clearer extraordinary-relief provision, or acted on, or put in the dicta of all Orders advising respondents of such a right. The article said "stubborn" above because most likely, now, a respondent would be disbarred for seeking justice in such a situation. It is just that heavy-handed.

Write Rule 60 Principles Into Rule 23

Indiana could solve much of the uncertainty with a relatively straightforward amendment.

Rule 23 should expressly permit extraordinary relief from a final disciplinary judgment upon proof of narrowly defined circumstances such as newly discovered material evidence, fraud or material misrepresentation affecting the proceeding, a void judgment, a fundamental denial of constitutional due process, or fraud upon the disciplinary tribunal itself.

The burden should be substantial. A lawyer shouldn't be able to reopen a disciplinary case simply because he disagrees with the result.

Require particularized allegations. Require evidence. Establish reasonable time limits for ordinary claims. Prohibit repetitive petitions merely rearguing matters already decided.

But claims involving a genuinely void judgment or provable fraud upon the tribunal deserve different treatment. The passage of time should not magically transform a fraudulent judgment into a truthful one.

Finality Is Important. So Is Being Right.

There is a legitimate reason courts resist reopening old cases. Witnesses die, memories fade, records disappear and litigation must eventually end. A disciplinary system allowing unlimited collateral attacks would itself become dysfunctional.

But that is an argument for a high standard, not necessarily for an impenetrable door.

Indiana's Supreme Court currently publishes a substantial docket of attorney-disciplinary matters, including numerous disciplinary orders during 2026. The institution plainly takes attorney accountability seriously.

It should demonstrate equal seriousness about the accuracy of its own disciplinary judgments.

Chief Justice Rush and her colleagues do not have to admit that Indiana's disciplinary system is fundamentally defective to improve it. Courts amend procedural rules precisely because experience reveals circumstances earlier rules did not adequately address.

Indiana should therefore establish an unmistakable extraordinary post-judgment remedy in Rule 23.

Protect the public from unethical lawyers. Protect legitimate disciplinary judgments from endless litigation. But also protect lawyers from the rare judgment that can later be proven fundamentally unjust.

That isn't being soft on attorney misconduct. It is being as fair to lawyers as the law is to criminal defendants, eliminating the Equal Protection Clause violations in every case of formal attorney discipline in Indiana that the U.S. District Court Judges, sitting in Indiana, ignore, and the 7th Circuit poo poos, knowing the SCOTUS never grants certiorari in such cases involving one party, especially an aggrieved lawyer. Remember that for decades, "a 1000 lawyers at the bottom of the sea was a good start." And "lawyers aren't whales, nobody is saving the lawyers."

It's recognizing that a justice system (the SCOIN) should always retain some mechanism for correcting an injustice of its own making, abusing the "exclusive" right and powers granted it in the Indiana Constitution which is itself unconstitutional in that regard.