Indiana’s Supreme Court Has a Power Problem — And Someone Needs to Say No

Long Overdue Scholarly Article Shows What HE Has Been Reporting

Hoosier Enquirer Editorial / Analysis

INDIANAPOLIS — Indiana lawyers take an oath to respect courts and judicial officers. That obligation, however, does not require silence when the judiciary itself accumulates extraordinary power or when members of the legal profession begin wondering whether disagreement with the people administering that power carries professional risk.

An unusually revealing discussion is now occurring inside Indiana's own legal establishment.

The latest Indiana Law Review Survey of Indiana Law of Professional Responsibility examines an Indiana Supreme Court disciplinary controversy and repeats a remarkable warning from Justice Geoffrey Slaughter: lawyers who are unpopular or represent unpopular clients can become particularly vulnerable to “enforcement overreach.” (mckinneylaw.iu.edu)

Those aren't the words of the Hoosier Enquirer. They came from a sitting justice of the Indiana Supreme Court.

And Indiana's Governor and General Assembly should pay attention.

For years, Chief Justice Loretta Rush has presided over a judicial branch possessing enormous authority not merely to decide lawsuits but to regulate the lawyers who appear before Indiana courts. The Supreme Court promulgates the disciplinary rules, ultimately decides disciplinary cases and determines sanctions. Hearing officers appointed by the Supreme Court hear contested disciplinary cases, but they do not make the final decision. The Supreme Court does. (in.gov)

Indiana's judiciary understandably describes this system as necessary to protect the public and maintain confidence in the legal profession. There is another principle equally deserving of protection, however: Who guards the guardians? Who regulates the regulators? A law review writng professor...only in Indiana, with a placeholder Governor and most inept General Assembly, devoid of real checks and balances. No branch, not the Supreme Court should have exclusive control of regulating and licnesing attorneys with their sour personalities.

That question becomes especially important when a judicial bureaucracy develops what critics may perceive as a culture in which challenging the institution is considerably less comfortable than agreeing with it.

Justice Slaughter Warned About the Slippery Slope, But Since Witte's Power Trip the Court Went Over the Cliff, at least since In Re Patrick Rocchio more than 10 years ago.

All the case since then should be reopen and fixed as being the travesties of justice that any normal person can see on their face.

Remarkable: The controversy discussed in the Indiana Law Review concerns Matter of Wruble, a disciplinary proceeding involving an attorney who responded to a former client's negative Google review with profane demands and disclosed damaging information connected to the former representation. HE has been writing and publishing article to shine light on the many cases and many problems Rush failed to address even yet. She is perfect in her own mind, but no one else sees her as anything more than a DEI failure. She has no power without respect.

The underlying conduct was hardly admirable. Indeed, Justice Slaughter acknowledged its offensive character.

His objection concerned something bigger: using the extraordinarily broad language of Indiana's Oath of Attorneys, particularly its requirement that lawyers “abstain from offensive personality,” as an independent basis for professional discipline.

Slaughter warned that the phrase is inherently subjective. What exactly constitutes an “offensive personality”? Offensive to whom? At what point does aggressive advocacy become offensive? What happens when an unpopular lawyer, political dissenter or attorney representing an unpopular client irritates the wrong people?

The Indiana Law Review recounts Slaughter's warning that such lawyers can be especially vulnerable to “enforcement overreach.” (mckinneylaw.iu.edu)

That observation should reverberate through every courthouse in Indiana.

The problem isn't whether lawyers should behave professionally. They should. The problem is whether vague standards can become weapons whose meaning depends upon who is enforcing them.

Indiana's own disciplinary rule recognizes both sides of this equation. As the law-review article emphasizes, the disciplinary process exists not only to protect the public, courts and bar from attorney misconduct but also to protect attorneys from unwarranted misconduct claims. (mckinneylaw.iu.edu)

That second obligation deserves considerably more attention.

The Court Is Prosecutor’s Overseer, Rulemaker and Final Judge

Consider the institutional arrangement.

The Disciplinary Commission investigates and prosecutes attorney misconduct. When formal charges are contested, a hearing officer conducts proceedings and reports findings to the Indiana Supreme Court. But the hearing officer cannot make the ultimate decision. That authority rests with the Supreme Court. (in.gov)

The Court also possesses immense authority over judicial discipline. Even after disciplinary masters conduct proceedings involving a judge, the Supreme Court isn't bound by their recommendation. It determines the sanction and can ultimately remove a judge from office. (in.gov)

Meanwhile, the Supreme Court writes and amends the rules governing Indiana's courts and lawyer admission and discipline. Its 2026 rulemaking materials explicitly explain that after receiving public comments, the Court can accept proposed amendments, reject them, rewrite them or continue studying them. (in.gov)

Each individual power has a legitimate constitutional or institutional explanation.

Taken together, however, they create an extraordinary concentration of authority.

And that is precisely why Indiana needs people inside the judiciary willing to say no.

Not “yes, Chief.”

Not “whatever the administration wants.”

Not another circle of institutional loyalists, sycophants, yes-ladies and yes-men afraid to challenge the prevailing wisdom.

Strong institutions need dissenters.

Then Came Hardy

The concern became even more relevant this summer.

On June 23, the Indiana Supreme Court decided In the Matter of Robert James Hardy Jr. Hardy, formerly DeKalb County's chief deputy prosecutor, was accused of making unfounded allegations that a judge and lawyer were having a sexual relationship and of making disparaging comments about various groups.

The hearing officer found violations and recommended at least a 30-day suspension but rejected one of the Commission's theories. The Disciplinary Commission sought review and an increased sanction.

The Supreme Court went considerably further.

Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rush concluded that the disputed professional-conduct provision applied and imposed a 180-day suspension with automatic reinstatement. (public.courts.in.gov)

Hardy's alleged comments shouldn't be minimized. Some were ugly, inflammatory and, according to the Court, damaging to confidence in the justice system.

But the institutional question remains.

The hearing officer recommended at least 30 days. The Supreme Court imposed 180.

The Court declared that it wasn't becoming the “speech police,” while simultaneously defining when lawyers' speech becomes sufficiently connected with their professional capacity to trigger discipline. (public.courts.in.gov)

That tension deserves examination, not automatic applause.

A lawyer does not surrender the First Amendment when receiving a bar card. Neither does professional licensure create immunity from legitimate professional standards. Drawing that line is difficult.

But when the institution drawing the line also possesses the ultimate power to punish the lawyer standing on the other side of it, precision, restraint and meaningful internal dissent become indispensable.

Indiana Now Has Dozens of Pending Disciplinary Cases

This isn't some dusty academic debate.

The Indiana judiciary's current public disciplinary docket lists numerous 2026 cases. As of late August, more than two dozen verified disciplinary complaints filed this year appear on the state's pending-case list. (secure.in.gov)

Those lawyers are not necessarily guilty of misconduct. The judiciary itself explains that ordinary grievances remain confidential until the Commission investigates and files a verified complaint. (secure.in.gov)

That distinction matters enormously.

Attorney discipline can destroy careers, reputations and livelihoods even before the ultimate sanction is imposed. Lawyers therefore deserve due process just as clients deserve protection from dishonest or incompetent attorneys.

A disciplinary system should aggressively prosecute theft, fraud, dishonesty, abandonment of clients and genuine corruption.

But a healthy disciplinary system should be equally aggressive about rejecting complaints motivated by personal grudges, litigation tactics, political disagreements or attempts to punish aggressive but lawful advocacy.

That isn't softness toward lawyers.

It is due process.

The Danger of the Judicial Echo Chamber

This brings Indiana back to Rush.

Chief Justice Rush has led the Court since 2014. No serious analysis should pretend that every disciplinary decision, administrative policy or controversial ruling is personally dictated by her. Indiana has a five-member Supreme Court, presently consisting of Rush and Justices Mark Massa, Geoffrey Slaughter, Christopher Goff and Derek Molter. (in.gov)

Indeed, the existence of Slaughter's warning demonstrates why criticism should not lazily treat the Court as monolithic.

But Rush is the chief justice.

Leadership therefore deserves scrutiny.

After more than a decade under one chief justice, Hoosiers are entitled to ask whether the administrative culture surrounding Indiana's judiciary encourages genuine disagreement or rewards institutional conformity.

That is where the danger of the yes-man culture emerges.

The Hoosier Enquirer cannot establish that court administrators privately behave as sycophants merely because they work within the judicial branch, and we will not present speculation as fact. But every powerful institution should deliberately surround its leadership with people willing to challenge assumptions rather than merely affirm them.

The judiciary needs that safeguard more than most institutions because judges possess something politicians don't: the authority to issue orders backed by the coercive power of government while enjoying substantial insulation from ordinary political accountability.

Lawyers Shouldn't Have to Wonder Whether Criticism Is Dangerous

There is another chilling question Indiana's legal profession should confront.

Would an Indiana lawyer feel entirely comfortable publicly criticizing the Supreme Court, its administration or its disciplinary machinery?

Some undoubtedly would. Others might think twice.That hesitation itself is worth investigating.

Indiana lawyers routinely advise clients about government power. They challenge prosecutors, police departments, agencies, governors, legislators and municipalities.

The institution regulating those lawyers should welcome similarly rigorous scrutiny of itself.

Criticism isn't contempt.

Disagreement isn't misconduct.

Unpopularity isn't professional incompetence.

And an abrasive personality isn't automatically proof that someone is unfit to practice law.

Justice Slaughter's warning is important precisely because it recognizes the danger. Vague standards can eventually be applied against people nobody anticipated when those standards were created.

Today's unsympathetic respondent establishes tomorrow's precedent.

Indiana Needs Independent Voices, Not Courtiers

None of this means abolishing attorney discipline. Quite the opposite.

A disciplinary system perceived as fair, restrained and independent becomes stronger because lawyers and citizens can trust its judgments.

Indiana should examine whether additional structural safeguards are warranted: greater independence between investigation, prosecution and adjudication; clearer standards governing speech-related discipline; meaningful review of charging decisions; greater transparency after proceedings become public; stronger protection against retaliatory grievances; and systematic reporting showing how sanctions compare with hearing-officer recommendations.

Most importantly, Indiana's judicial leadership should encourage disagreement within its own ranks.

The most valuable person in a powerful leader's conference room isn't necessarily the person saying yes.

Sometimes it is the person willing to say:Chief, I think we're wrong.

Justice Slaughter effectively demonstrated that principle when he warned of a “dangerous slippery slope” and potential “enforcement overreach.” The Indiana Law Review considered that warning important enough to explore it at length. (mckinneylaw.iu.edu)

Indiana should do the same.

Chief Justice Rush and the Indiana Supreme Court administer one of the state's most powerful institutions. Their decisions deserve respect.

They do not deserve immunity from criticism.

Judicial independence means protecting courts from improper outside pressure. It should never mean insulating judicial administration from public examination.

Indiana doesn't need a Supreme Court surrounded by courtiers.

It needs a Supreme Court surrounded by independent lawyers, judges and administrators confident enough to disagree with one another—and secure enough to know that saying no will never threaten their place within Indiana's system of justice.

That is not an attack on judicial independence.

It is what judicial independence is supposed to protect.

The underlying Indiana Law Review survey is particularly valuable because the criticism of possible “enforcement overreach” is grounded in Justice Slaughter's own published reasoning, rather than an outside accusation. Read the Indiana Law Review article

Justice Slaughter new to the bench at the time in 2017, recused himself in the case HE has covered and questioned in In Re Doug Bernacchi, which was an error on his part as he had no known conflict of interest and thus, his recusal was unethical. He could have seen that case was a complete lawfare fraud. See link to related article below.