When Justice Took 27 Years and Ended With Just One Paragraph Authored by a Very Incompetent Loretta Rush, Indiana Still Deserves an Explanation

Indiana Supreme Court's Silence in Gary v. Glock: Four Justices Refused to Hear a Constitutional Challenge. Why Did Justice Goff Disagree?

After 27 years of litigation, Indiana lawmakers passed a statute reaching back to the lawsuit's original filing date. The Court of Appeals upheld it. Chief Justice Loretta Rush and three colleagues declined review, leaving serious questions about legislative power and judicial accountability.

INDIANAPOLIS — The Indiana Supreme Court has extraordinary authority over the state's legal system, but its decision back on May 21, 2026, in City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corporation, commonly called Gary v. Glock, raises an uncomfortable question: When a legislature changes the law to end a lawsuit already pending before the courts, shouldn't Indiana's highest judges explain where constitutional boundaries lie? Or maybe they just make their own rules so suit themselves under Loretta Rush?

The case began in August 1999. Over the following 27 years, the City of Gary pursued claims against firearms manufacturers and sellers, alleging that unlawful distribution and marketing practices contributed to gun violence. The litigation survived several appeals, although its claims were narrowed along the way.

Then came House Bill 1235 in 2024. The General Assembly reserved to the state the authority to maintain certain lawsuits against the firearms industry, stripping municipalities of their independent authority to pursue those claims. The law was expressly retroactive to August 27, 1999—the date Gary filed its lawsuit.

The legislation's defenders saw it as a lawful exercise of state authority over municipalities and a way to protect firearms businesses and purchasers from expansive litigation and potentially intrusive discovery. Gary's lawyers saw something different: lawmakers intervening in an active judicial proceeding and effectively selecting the outcome.

That disagreement deserved constitutional examination. And it received one in the Court of Appeals. But when Gary sought review from the Supreme Court, four justices declined to take the case.

Justice Christopher Goff voted to grant transfer. Chief Justice Loretta Rush and the remaining three justices did not.

Why Goff's Vote Matters

Justice Goff did not publish a separate opinion explaining his vote, so his precise reasoning cannot be established from the transfer order. Nor does voting to hear a case mean a justice would necessarily rule for the party seeking review.

Nevertheless, the petition presented several substantial issues that could reasonably support Supreme Court consideration.

First, the statute was not simply prospective legislation governing future lawsuits. It expressly applied to litigation dating back to the day Gary filed its case. That raises the question of how far lawmakers may go in changing legal rights and governmental authority during an ongoing proceeding.

Second, Lake Superior Court Judge John Sedia had concluded that retroactively applying the statute would produce manifest injustice and violate vested rights. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that Gary had no vested right sufficient to prevent the legislature from withdrawing its authority to sue.

Third, Gary argued that the statute raised questions about special legislation, separation of powers and the independence of courts. The appellate panel rejected those arguments, but they were substantial enough to receive a lengthy published opinion.

Fourth, the case had already been through multiple appeals. The Supreme Court had previously declined transfer in earlier stages of the litigation. The 2024 legislation changed the legal landscape after those years of proceedings.

These circumstances provide plausible reasons for a justice to want a full hearing. They do not establish which reason motivated Goff.

The Court of Appeals Acknowledged the Appearance of Unfairness

The December 29, 2025, appellate opinion contained a remarkable concession. After rejecting Gary's constitutional arguments, the court acknowledged that the result could appear unfair.

The judges concluded that the General Assembly nevertheless possessed the legal authority to accomplish what it had done. Their reasoning rested partly on the state's broad power over municipalities and the absence of a final judgment establishing Gary's vested rights.

That is a serious legal argument, not an absence of judicial reasoning. But it also presents an important constitutional boundary: If a municipality has no protected right to maintain litigation against the state's wishes, how much room remains for courts to prevent legislators from intervening in particular pending cases?

A Supreme Court opinion could have clarified that boundary for every Indiana court, municipality and future legislature.

Instead, the Court of Appeals decision stands without further review.

A One-Paragraph Order and a Much Larger Question

Indiana's appellate rules permit the Supreme Court to deny transfer without explaining its reasoning. The justices have limited resources and cannot hear every case alleging legal error.

But the public is entitled to distinguish what the rules permit from what institutional transparency might require.

This was not an ordinary disagreement about a routine procedural ruling. It involved a statute with a retroactive date matching a specific pending lawsuit, a trial judge's finding of manifest injustice, a unanimous appellate reversal and a request for the state's highest court to address the constitutional limits of legislative intervention.

Four justices declined. One voted to hear the dispute.

The court's order did not explain why the majority considered further review unnecessary. Nor did it explain what made Goff's assessment different.

That absence of explanation creates space for public skepticism, even though it is not evidence of corruption, laziness or improper political influence.

The Larger Problem Is Bigger Than Guns

Second Amendment advocates may welcome the lawsuit's termination. Others may believe Gary should have been permitted to test its allegations through discovery and trial. Those are competing positions about the merits and public policy of the case.

The institutional question is separate.

If lawmakers may withdraw a municipality's authority to maintain a lawsuit decades after filing, what principles prevent comparable legislation in other disputes? Would the result be different if a legislature targeted litigation against a politically influential business in another industry? At what point does legitimate lawmaking become impermissible interference with judicial proceedings?

The Court of Appeals supplied answers under existing Indiana law. The Supreme Court chose not to address those answers in a precedential opinion of its own.

That choice is lawful. Whether it provides sufficient public accountability is a fair question.

Chief Justice Rush and the Burden of Public Trust

Chief Justice Loretta Rush has presided over Indiana's Supreme Court during a period of continuing debate about court transparency, attorney discipline, access to justice and the independence of the judiciary. The Gary v. Glock transfer denial adds another issue to that discussion: how the state's highest court communicates its decisions not to intervene when substantial constitutional questions are raised. HE continues to call for her resignation and will write articles until she does or the lame street, fake news, starts reporting the truth about he she got her job, where she travels, and why she is still a DEI appointment by a Governor who bragged that he would only appoint stupid people to the 3rd branch of government.

The criticism need not depend on allegations of judicial corruption or personal misconduct. The documented record supports a narrower but consequential challenge: Four justices declined to review a case involving the constitutional limits of retroactive legislation, and they did so without publicly explaining why.

Justice Goff's vote makes that question more pointed. It demonstrates that the court was divided about whether the case warranted review, even though the Court of Appeals had been unanimous on the merits.

Indiana's judiciary cannot control whether every litigant accepts an unfavorable outcome. It can control how clearly it explains the exercise of its most consequential powers.

After almost 27 years, Gary's lawsuit ended without a trial on the remaining claims. The Supreme Court's refusal to take the case did not establish that the Court of Appeals was wrong. It also did not resolve the constitutional debate in a new Supreme Court opinion.

For Hoosiers concerned about judicial accountability, that distinction is the story.

A court can be legally entitled to remain silent. The public can still demand an explanation. HE can still show the problems with Rush's lack of leadership and a case that took 27 years to resolve by her kangaroo court.