Buckley Has Already Had a Second Chance. What Will Indiana’s Supreme Court Do Now? Hoosier Enquirer | News analysis | October 18, 2026

PORTER COUNTY — The question raised in Hoosier Enquirer’s earlier coverage has become a public disciplinary proceeding: What consequences will Judge Christopher A. Buckley face beyond his drunken-driving sentence? Indiana’s precedents support outcomes ranging from a public reprimand to an unpaid suspension. Buckley’s disciplinary history gives regulators a substantial argument for something stronger than a reprimand, but neither permanent removal nor disbarment is an automatic consequence.

The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications has filed two misconduct counts in Supreme Court case 26S-JD-373. One concerns Buckley’s OWI conviction; the other alleges he invoked his judicial position to obtain favorable treatment from police. Those disciplinary allegations await adjudication. According to the court’s October 16 announcement, he may answer within 20 days; the Supreme Court ultimately decides the case.[1]

As HE previously reported, Senior Judge Michael N. Pagano is handling the court’s docket under an October 14 order. That temporary arrangement should not be confused with a final disciplinary sanction. It tells the public who is handling cases while Buckley’s situation remains unresolved.[2]

Rule 25 governs this case; Rule 23 matters to his law license. Indiana’s Admission and Discipline Rule 23 governs attorney disciplinary proceedings and defines attorneys to include judges. It recognizes violations of judicial ethics as potential grounds for professional discipline. But Buckley’s pending JD case was expressly brought under Rule 25, the rule governing judicial discipline.[3]

The distinction affects both procedure and consequences. Rule 25 authorizes suspension, removal, conditions on judicial duties, reprimands, fines, costs and discipline as an attorney. It also preserves jurisdiction after resignation or retirement. Leaving the bench therefore would not, by itself, end the commission’s authority over this conduct.[4]

The sharpest fact in the filing may be that Buckley was already operating under an agreement intended to address earlier concerns. According to the commission, he entered a deferred-resolution agreement on March 31, 2025, scheduled to continue until March 2027. It required continued therapy and a Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program monitoring agreement. Regulators say his August 2026 OWI arrest and conviction triggered its rescission.[5]

The filing also identifies a 2009 OWI conviction, before Buckley became an attorney, and a 2021 public commission admonition concerning bond procedures. It recounts a 2024 domestic dispute for which a special prosecutor declined criminal charges. That last distinction matters: an investigated complaint is not a conviction, and background allegations do not become established misconduct merely because they appear in a disciplinary filing.[5]

For purposes of assessing the likely sanction, however, a prior intervention followed by another alcohol-related offense raises a serious question: Will another treatment-and-monitoring arrangement adequately protect public confidence? That is an inference from the history alleged, not a finding the Supreme Court has already made.

Indiana has reprimanded judges for OWI—even when they sought favorable treatment. In Matter of Felts, 902 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. 2009), Allen Circuit Judge Thomas Felts received a public reprimand after pleading guilty to a Class A misdemeanor involving an alcohol concentration of at least .15. The court accepted an agreed sanction that recognized his cooperation. That decision defeats any claim that an OWI conviction necessarily ends an Indiana judge’s career.[6]

A closer comparison is In re Garrard, No. 98S00-1607-JD-381 (Ind. Aug. 3, 2016). Senior appellate Judge William Garrard was convicted of OWI endangering a person after a collision. He asked an officer to take him home and forget the drinking and driving, and identified himself as a senior judge. The Supreme Court nevertheless imposed a public reprimand.[7]

Garrard’s mitigation included prompt self-reporting, voluntary contact with JLAP, compliance with its requests, cooperation and remorse. Buckley could invoke that precedent in seeking comparable treatment. Regulators could distinguish it by pointing to his earlier admonition and the deferred agreement already in place. A useful comparison must address both the similar conduct and the different histories.

The 2019 proceedings involving Judges Andrew Adams, Bradley Jacobs and Sabrina Bell provide another benchmark. Following an alcohol-fueled confrontation outside an Indianapolis White Castle, the Supreme Court approved unpaid suspensions of 60 days for Adams and 30 days each for Jacobs and Bell. Their conduct differed from Buckley’s, but the cases demonstrate that alcohol-related misconduct can lead to removal from judicial duties without pay.[8]

Those judges benefited from findings that they had no prior disciplinary history and that the episode was isolated, alongside other mitigation. That distinction could matter considerably here. The 30- and 60-day sanctions are comparisons, however—not a sentencing schedule that fixes Buckley’s outcome.

Rule 23 does not automatically convert this misdemeanor into a law-license suspension. Section 11.1 requires reporting of felony and misdemeanor guilty findings, but its specific felony-conviction suspension procedure concerns crimes punishable as felonies. Buckley’s reported Class C misdemeanor conviction does not satisfy that felony trigger merely because it is serious misconduct by a judge.[9]

A recent DI case illustrates the difference. In Matter of Jeffrey C. Eggers, No. 25S-DI-353 (Ind. Jan. 23, 2026), the Supreme Court imposed an interim attorney suspension after a Level 6 felony OWI guilty finding under Rule 23(11.1)(a). That was an interim protective measure, not a final disbarment order. It cannot simply be transplanted to Buckley’s misdemeanor case.[10]

Nor are removal from judicial office and loss of a law license interchangeable. In Matter of Brown, 4 N.E.3d 619 (Ind. 2014), the Supreme Court removed a judge for extensive misconduct while expressly allowing her to continue practicing law. In the Bennington proceedings, the court approved resignation and a permanent judicial ban while permitting retention of the law license. Those cases involved different misconduct, but establish the distinction.[11]

What is likely to happen next? A negotiated agreement is a realistic possibility, as the cited cases demonstrate. Otherwise, the formal process provides for three judicial masters to hear evidence and report to the Supreme Court. The commission must prove misconduct by clear and convincing evidence; Buckley may present witnesses, challenge evidence and be represented by counsel. The justices retain authority over the ultimate sanction.[12]

HE’s assessment is that an unpaid suspension, potentially accompanied by treatment or monitoring conditions, is a credible outcome if the material allegations are established. A public reprimand remains supported by relevant precedent. Removal becomes a stronger possibility if the proven record persuades the court that lesser measures cannot adequately protect the judiciary and the public.

The public should expect a reasoned explanation whichever route the court chooses. If Buckley receives a reprimand, the justices should explain why his prior history and rescinded agreement do not warrant more. If he receives a suspension or permanent exclusion from the bench, they should identify what distinguishes his case from the judges who received lesser sanctions.

HE’s earlier concern about accountability now has a concrete test. The outcome belongs to the Indiana Supreme Court—not the chief justice acting alone—and fairness requires weighing established misconduct, relevant history and meaningful mitigation. Hoosiers deserve an outcome that makes those standards visible.

Sources

1. Indiana Judicial Branch, October 16, 2026 announcement.

2. Hoosier Enquirer, “The ‘First-Time Offender’ Judge Had a 2009 OWI”.

3. Rule 23, Sections 1–2; charging document below.

4. Admission and Discipline Rule 25.

5. Buckley formal charges, especially paragraphs 5–17.

6. Matter of Felts, 902 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. 2009).

7. In re Garrard, August 3, 2016.

8. Adams, Jacobs and Bell, November 12, 2019.

9. Rule 23, Section 11.1.

10. Eggers interim suspension, January 23, 2026.

11. Matter of Brown; Bennington opinion.

12. Official judicial disciplinary process.